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during the same period, but we could not determine this
number more precisely.
To our knowledge, voriconazole is the ﬁrst non-immuno-
suppressive drug to be shown to directly inﬂuence skin carci-
nogenesis. Other studies have shown an elevated risk factor
for other photosensitizing drug classes, such as diuretics [6],
but the link with therapy and squamous cell carcinoma was
not so obvious. The speed of development of preneoplastic
keratoses and of aggressive squamous cell carcinoma(s)
suggests that voriconazole may act as a promoting agent in
such predisposed patients. Regression of preneoplastic lesions
after voriconazole withdrawal supports this hypothesis.
Posaconazole therapy did not trigger skin lesions in patients 1
and 2, nor did itraconazole in patient 4, revealing that the
effect of voriconazole or a voriconazole metabolite is speciﬁc.
The precise mechanisms of both photosensitivity and skin
carcinogenesis are not known. Oxidative stress is known to
be of the ﬁrst importance in UV-induced skin damage, and
generation of reactive oxygen species and/or nitric oxide by
voriconazole or its metabolites may be implicated. It has also
been suggested that voriconazole may inhibit a step in the
metabolism of vitamin A, leading to an indirect retinoid
effect. On the other hand, immunosuppression is a well-
known risk factor for malignancy, and is probably synergisti-
cally involved in the rapid onset of squamous cell carcinoma.
In conclusion, physicians must be aware of possible aggres-
sive squamous cell carcinoma in immunocompromised
patients receiving prolonged voriconazole therapy, and of the
possibility of developing skin phototoxicity (mainly actinic ker-
atoses). Prevention is based on rigorous photoprotection and
cutaneous monitoring. If photosensitivity develops, therapy
must be immediately withdrawn. To our knowledge, vorico-
nazole is the ﬁrst non-immunosuppressive molecule that has
been clearly shown to induce skin carcinoma. Studies on
mechanisms involved in voriconazole-induced carcinogenesis
should provide new data on UV-induced carcinogenesis.
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Abstract
To evaluate compliance with preparedness plans, actors simulat-
ing avian inﬂuenza attended various hospital emergency depart-
ments and public health centres during the last quarter of 2007.
Most centres (89%) did not respond correctly. The useful infor-
mation obtained was sent to the medical and administrative staff
who were responsible for the preparedness plans. Awareness of
these errors and their rectiﬁcation can lead to improvements in
the response to any case of inﬂuenza with pandemic potential
and in the capacity to combat any other emergent or re-emer-
gent community infection.
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The variability of the inﬂuenza virus and the appearance of
new subtypes that may affect humans after successive muta-
tions of animal viruses or as a result of genetic reassortment
of human and animal viruses, together with experience
gained from 20th Century pandemics, has led experts to
conclude that there is a high risk of a pandemic and that
national and regional health ofﬁcials should draw up pan-
demic preparedness plans to minimize possible morbidity
and mortality [1].
The World Health Organization [2] provides updated cri-
teria for the drawing up of pandemic preparedness plans.
Although preparedness involves all social sectors, the role
of health professionals in all phases of the pandemic is essen-
tial because they act as an exemplary reference for the wider
community and can also effectively help to avoid nosocomial
transmission of potentially-pandemic viruses, both before and
during the pandemic phase.
The present study aimed to verify the degree of compli-
ance with inﬂuenza pandemic preparedness plans using simu-
lated cases.
The study was carried out in Catalonia, a region located
in the northeast of Spain with 7.3 million inhabitants, during
the last quarter of 2007. Simulated cases of H5N1 inﬂuenza
infection were prepared using actors trained by physicians
and epidemiologists. The actors had already worked for the
Department of Health in Catalonia on various occasions as
standardized patients in objective structured clinical examina-
tions that form part of the Catalan Medical Licensing Exami-
nation, which is taken by all senior medical students. During
November 2007 (before the seasonal epidemic had begun),
the actors attended various hospital emergency departments
and primary health care centres and simulated the cases
described below.
Simulated case 1. A 32-year-old male immigrant who
arrived in Spain, 5 days ago, from Nigeria. He presents
with nonproductive dry cough, and chills and is taking
analgesics that do not resolve the problem.
Simulated case 2. A 27-year-old female biologist working in
avian surveillance in an area containing many aquatic birds.
There is no history of foreign travel. She presents with
inﬂuenza syndrome (temperature 39C, malaise, dyspnoea
for 2 days and dry cough). She is taking paracetamol.
Simulated case 3. A 23-year-old male waiter who has been
on holiday for 20 days in the house of the parents of a friend
from Djakarta located in a rural area where chickens and
other fowl are raised. He returned to Barcelona 2 days ago,
but has had chills, high fever, headache and nonproductive
cough for 4 days, with dyspnoea in the last 24 h.
Simulated case 4. A 38-year-old male industrial engineer
who works as an executive in a computer science com-
pany. Every month, he has to travel to Singapore for
professional reasons for 1–2 weeks and takes advantage of
the weekends to travel to rural regions and take photo-
graphs as part of his favourite hobby.
All the actors were trained to simulate coughing and chills
and to report documented high fever and having taken anti-
pyretics immediately before attending the health care centre.
Simulated cases used a checklist of speciﬁc behaviour to
evaluate the performance.
According to the clinical and epidemiological deﬁnitions in
place at the time of the simulation, all the simulated cases
were suspected cases of H5N1 avian inﬂuenza A virus infec-
tion and should have activated the phase 3 protocols, includ-
ing the immediate introduction of the following measures: (i)
ﬁt the patient with a surgical mask before triage according to
cough etiquette; (ii) ﬁt the patient with a surgical mask after
triage if not done before; (iii) carry out chest X-rays; and (iv)
report the suspected case to the public health authorities.
All health centres had received speciﬁc guidelines to manage
avian inﬂuenza patients; support material in different lan-
guages to facilitate the reception of possible inﬂuenza cases;
support material on pandemic preparedness plans [Microsoft
PowerPoint presentation (Microsoft Corp., Redmond, WA,
USA) with seventy slides and text explanations] to enable
TABLE 1. Compliance with anticipated activities in the plan
of action against suspected H5N1 avian inﬂuenza, phase 3
Activity
Hospital
emergency
department
(n = 8)
Primary
health care
centres
(n = 8)
Total
(n = 16)
Pre-triage respiratory hygiene in
waiting areas (cough etiquette)
0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)
Surgical mask after triage 2* (25.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (12.5%)
Chest X-ray 8 (100.0%) 2 (25.0%) 10 (62.5%)
Reporting of suspected case to
public health
0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)
*The simulation was detected by staff in one case.
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training in each centre on the plans’ objectives and required
action. At the time of the simulation, it was known that 225
training activities on pandemic preparedness had been car-
ried out in 96 centres. Centres were also requested to have
a speciﬁc preparedness plan for the different pandemic
phases. All the material was also available on the Department
of Health website.
The simulated cases attended nine hospital emergency
departments and nine primary health care centres. Imple-
mentation of advised activities by health centres is shown in
Table 1.
The protocol was activated as required in only two cases,
whereas, in another case, health workers suspected a simu-
lated case, thus terminating the simulation.
The results of the simulation, which included a video
recording of the actors explaining their experiences, were
made available to those responsible for the preparedness
plans and were summarized in a report made available to all
managers of health service providers. They were also pre-
sented in a session for trainers who were responsible for
pandemic preparedness in each health centre.
Clinical simulations are a valid method for assessment in
medical education [3] but, as far as we know, they have not
been used to check compliance with public health protocols.
There was evident noncompliance with avian inﬂuenza pan-
demic preparedness plans: 89% of centres did not respond
correctly despite the guidelines and the speciﬁc training ses-
sions for health care workers. Although the media play a large
role in sensitizing people to public health problems and avian
inﬂuenza had ceased to be newsworthy some 2 years before
this simulation exercise, the risk of cases in Catalonia coming
from countries with demonstrated avian and human cases
(cases 1, 3 and 4) or the possibility of cases in people exposed
to migrating birds should be evident. However, apart from
two centres, health staff did not consider the possibility of risk.
A key element in drawing up preparedness plans is discus-
sion with health workers [4–6], especially emergency depart-
ment staff [2,4]. The preparation of health workers is
essential because they will receive the primary impact in all
phases of the pandemic. The possibility of increased risk or
social alarm depends, in large part, on whether they comply
with previously established protocols.
There may be suspected cases outside health centres,
although it is impossible to detect them. However, suspected
cases in any phase should be detected by health centres and,
especially, by emergency departments.
Simulated studies of the evolution of the pandemic in vari-
ous scenarios [5–7] and studies of the efﬁciency of various
interventions [8] are essential to prioritize the most effective
and efﬁcient options and especially to prepare plans for
application at times of great medical demand accompanied by
media pressure: under these circumstances, it is not easy to
generate correct protocols. Therefore plans of actuation
should be followed without major deviations. If experience
shows that the plans are not adequate to cope with the real-
life problem, which is foreseeable and has occurred with
inﬂuenza as a result of the new H1N1 subtype A, adjust-
ments can be made.
Simulated cases test the capacity of the system to follow
established protocols. Our experience shows that they
detect errors that, when reported to those individuals
responsible for preparedness plans, serve as a warning of
unpreparedness. Awareness of these errors should be con-
sidered a ﬁrst step in their rectiﬁcation and the adaptation
of plans to minimize the impact of a potentially-pandemic
inﬂuenza virus [9–12]. It was planned to carry out follow-up
checks every 2 years according to the Catalan Pandemic Plan
to determine whether there had been improvements in the
health centres. The arrival of the new swine ﬂu and the sub-
sequent pandemic (H1N1) 2009 did not allow this simulation
exercise to be performed again and most centres have
implemented corrective measures to face this new scenario.
Inﬂuenza pandemic preparedness plans will always require
adjustment according to the characteristics of the virus and
its clinical presentation and the main population groups
affected. However, these adjustments are more effective and
inﬁnitely less expensive than drawing up plans and protocols
only when the real problem appears. It may be that uncer-
tainty about the evolution of a new inﬂuenza virus subtype
leads to the introduction of actions that, in the light of devel-
opments, may seem disproportionate, although over-reaction
is probably preferable to under-reaction [13].
In conclusion, the use of simulated cases of avian inﬂuenza
to verify the level of compliance with pandemic preparedness
plans revealed errors by medical staff. This type of simulation
may be useful in other environments and situations with the
aim of detecting deviations from established plans. Aware-
ness of these errors and their rectiﬁcation can lead to
improvements in the response to any case of inﬂuenza with
pandemic potential and in the capacity to combat any other
emergent or re-emergent community infection.
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